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Abstract
Multisignature is a variant of digital signature which enables a document to be signed
by multiple signers simultaneously in a collaboration. It ensures the fairness property of
the signer. Blind signature is another variant of digital signature in which a message is
signed without disclosing its content. Blindness is an important property of blind signa-
ture in which, the message and the signature are unlinkable after signature is attached to
the message.
In this Thesis, we designed a Blind Multisignature protocol with security features of blind
signatures and multisignature. The security of the scheme lies in hard computational
assumptions such as Integer Factorization problem (IFP), computational Diffie-Hellman
problem (CDHP) and discrete logarithmic problem (DLP). The correctness of the scheme
is tested mathematically and the scheme is also implemented in Java platform. The com-
putational cost of the proposed scheme is low and the signature length (in byte) is nominal
with the message size. The time of computation of each phase is computed and found to
be low as compared to competent schemes. The security analysis of the scheme is done
rigorously and the security features such as untraceability, blindness and unforgeability of
the proposed scheme has been analysed and found secure under the attack. The scheme
has properties of both blind signature and multi-signature. This scheme can be applied to
real life applications such as electronic cash and electronic voting.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Framework of Blind Signature
The first scholar to propose the concept of the blind signature scheme was D. Chaum is
the first one who bring the concept of blind signature in 1982[12]. The anonymity of
the members is guranteed in the blind signature scheme. There are two parties in this
signature scheme the requester R and the signer S[3]. Message M will be signed by the
signer and send to the requester which wants the sign on that message. At the begining
the Requester blinds the message M into M’ and sends M’ to S. Then S signs the message
M’ and output the s’ to the requester R. After recieving the s’ the requester R unblinds
the signature s’ to s which is the signature on the message M. the content of message M
can be protected by R in this scheme. Likewise, at whatever point S doles out a mark
pair of (M,s), B can’t focus when, or for whom he/she marked that message. A few
applications which utilize blind signature are internet voting and digital cash. When we
present an online vote, we may like for that vote to be unknown so nobody can tell whom
we voted in favor of. Also with electronic money, we may not need another person to
know who we are the point at which we spend it. This is like ordinary paper money,
when we make a purchase,the seller pretty much has no clue who we are, yet we can
presumably tell whether the cash we issued him is legitimate. Specically, in this electronic
money situation, a report relates to an electronic coin or note, and the endorser speaks to
a bank.The high-roller holds namelessness in any exchange that includes electronic coins
on the off chance that they are signed blindly.
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Variations of Blind Signature Restrictive Blind Signature:
Restrictive blind signature means that a requester can blind the documents but with some
restrictions. It is a protocol which says that any user can request for a blind signature
on a document form a valid signer. But it has certain limitations as compared to the
normal blind signature[28]. Like normal blind signature the user can blind the message
in any way but with the restriction in the choice of message and should follow the certain
protocols so that the genuine message and the blinded message are isomorphic[28]. The
blind signature ensures that the signature generated by the signer for one transaction can
only be used once. But if the requester becomes malicious and tries to replay the signature
again after some time duration then the identity of the requester should be revealed. This
can be done by applying restrictive blindness to the normal blind signature scheme.
Revocable Anonymity:
In any communication, protecting the contents is not enough. Sometimes it is required
to keep the identity of the recipient as private. In the context of electronic commerce, If
no anonymity is provided then the users preferences can be known .With this information
anyone can know the profile of users and send them targeted advertisements or can sell
the profiles to other commercial units. The buyer will get problem by this as they want
to do the transactions anonymously. Blind signature allows a user to do any transactions
anonymously. But in case of any legal disputes the identity of the malevolent user need
to be revealed. This is known as revocable anonymity i.e to revoke the anonymity when
needed[13].
Fair Blind Siganture:
Though it is another variation of blind signature, it can be obtained from the restrictive
blind signature also[23]. In a fair blind signature protocol a single trustee or multiple
trustees may get involved in the system.It is also used to revoke the anonymity of mali-
cious users and the trustee used to do that. To do so,the trustee view all the parts of the
blinding process . For this reason the trustee need to be remain online all the time, which
compromises the efficiency of the system. Later many fair blind signatures are developed
in which the trustee need to keep a public-private key pair. The trustee can only involved
in the tracing protocol and by using the key pairs he can trace the identity of the malicious
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user.
Partial Blind Signature:
To achieve revocable anonymity, another variation of blind signature called as partial
blind signature is also used.To trace the identity of the malicious user, the signer need
to keep some data in the databse during the transaction. This will increase the space of
the database. When the requester tries to use the signature twice, the signer checks the
database to identify that requester. But to search the databse each time is not so feasible.
Partial blind signature overcomes this problem[3]. In a partial blind signature protocol,
the signer and the requester have some common agreed information. The requester can
blind the message but the common agreed information need to be remain unblind. By
using the common information the signer can trace the identity of the requester when
needed. The concept of partial blind signature was developed by Abe and Okamato[3].
The blind signature has 4 phases they are:
1. Blinding Phase: In this phase the requester hides the message or blind the mes-
sage for the signer such that the signer can not be able to see the actual content of
the message and he did that by either multiplying the message with random number
or by encrypting it with some key or it can be hashed also.
2. Signing Phase: In this phase the signer signs the message by its own signature
but without revealing the actual content of the message. The signer signs blindly on
the message sent to him by the requester.
3. Unblinding Phase: In this Phase the requester unblind the message sent by the
signer.
4. Veryfying Phase:In this phase the verifier receives the signature and it verifies
the legitimacy of the signature by checking the verifying equations.
The following requirements, namely, correctness, blindness, unforgeability and un-
traceability must meet for blind signature.
• Correctness: Those who has the signer’s public key will be able to identify the
signature of the message signed by using the blind signature scheme.
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Figure 1.1: Blind Signature
• Blindness: The signer must not be able to find the content of the message.
• Unforgeability: No one else beside signer will be able to derive any forged
signature and pass the verification process because the signature is the proof of the
signer[15].
• Untraceability: There must be no link between the message and the signature
and no one including the signer will be able to find it[14].
1.2 Framework of Multisignature
A multisignature scheme is a variant of digital signature scheme, which enables a doc-
ument to be signed by multiple signers simultaneously in a collaboration[18]. Normal
signature scheme is used by all the signers for signing a document. Multisignature is
more secure and eliminates the latest attacks. Individual signers are identified by the In-
formation contained in Multisignature. The main drawback of this scheme is that both
the length of the signature and the computation cost of its computation for verification
increases linearly according to the number of signers. Two important properties which
must be fulfilled by the multisignature to achive the optimum signature are[20]:
• Individual signature and multisignature must be of the same size.
• Individual signature and multisignature must use the same verfication process.
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Figure 1.2: Multisignature
1.3 Security Features of Blind Multisignature
The following are some of the security features in Blind Multisignature:
Unforgeability: No one else beside signer will be able to derive any forged signa-
ture and pass the verification process because the signature is the proof of the signer[15].
Untraceability:There must be no link between the message and the signature and
no one including the signer will be able to find it[14].
Blindness:The Signer should not be able to know to find the content of the message
even if he has the message signature pair.
IND-CCA1 attack:Indistinguishability is an important property in cryptosystem,
if the cipher text is indistinguishable then it will be hard for the adversary to identify the
different pair of cipher text based on the encrypted message. Indistinguishability is the
basic requirement. Semantic security and IND-CCA are equivalent and are being used
interchangeably in many cryptographic proofs. IND-CCA attacks can also be performed
on digital signatures[4].
The attacker send twoo messages to the challenger then the challenger take one message
randomly and encrypt it ans resend to the attacker, now a cyptosystem is considered se-
cure in terms of indistinguishability if he is not able to find which message is encrypted
with probability greater that 1/2. If attacker is able to identify the message with probabil-
ity greater than 1/2, then attacker has the advantage in identifying the encrypted message,
and the scheme is not secure in terms of indistinguishability [9].
5
1.4 Applications of Blind Multisignature Introduction
1.4 Applications of Blind Multisignature
1.4.1 Online Election System
E-voting is a most critical utilization Blind Multisignature scheme. Voter is free from
of any reasonable in light of the fact that he/she put make their choice indiscriminately
administrator is only the power who gives the sign. E-voting application may be sorted
out by any administration delegate, private association, or any extraordinary gathering
of individuals. The security of client who make the choice is keeping hidden. Each
client’s make choice can be effectively confirmed with the assistance of administrator’s
identity. The privacy issue identified with digital signature is a touch explained by Blind
Multisignature scheme[22].
1.4.2 Digital cash
Digital cash or e-cash was first introduced by D. Chaum as an anonymous cash system. It
is interesting to know that ecoins are blind signatures.
So we can see one transaction can give one valid token packet or one valid signature.
For multiple transaction the corresponding signatures or the e-coins will be different.
But, nowadays many requester becomes malicious and spends the e-coins for multiple
times. This is known as the double spending problem. Though blind signature provides
untraceability or unlinkability but sometimes it is necessary to reveal the identity of the
requester. To do so,one requester should not blind all the internal structure of the message.
It should blind the outer part of the message so that by using the public parameters the
signer can able to trace the identity of the malicious requester. This is kind of blind
signature is known as restrictive blind signature[21].
1.5 Motivation
In e-commerce world such as an e-voting system authentication is very important as well
as anonymity and confidentiality. The answer to this problem is a blind multisignature that
is based upon a difficult trapdoor function which is discrete logarithm problem. So we
intend to design such a scheme that is immune against most of the common cryptographic
attacks and along with the securtiy low computational overhead also.
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1.6 Objective
To create another Blind Multisignature scheme based upon computationally hard suspi-
cion like discrete logarithmic problem (DLP). The main focus of Our scheme will funda-
mentally concentrate on the following attributes:
1. To design a Blind multisignature with the properties of blind signature as well as
multisignature
2. It should have low computational cost and computational overhead.
3. It must fulfil all the requirements namely correctness, unforgeability, unlinkability,
and blindness.
1.7 Contribution
In this Thesis, we designed a Blind Multisignature protocol with security features of blind
signatures and multisignature. The security of the scheme lies in hard computational
assumptions such as Integer Factorization problem (IFP), computational Diffie-Hellman
problem (CDHP) and discrete logarithmic problem (DLP). The correctness of the scheme
is tested mathematically and the scheme is also implemented in Java platform. The com-
putational cost of the proposed scheme is low and the signature length (in byte) is nominal
with the message size. The time of computation of each phase is computed and found to
be low as compared to competent schemes. The security analysis of the scheme is done
rigorously and the security features such as untraceability, blindness and unforgeability
has been analysed and found secure under the attack. The scheme has the properties of
blind signature anonymity as well as multi-signature. This scheme can be applied to real
life applications such as electronic cash and electronic voting.
1.8 Organization of Thesis
The rest of Thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2:In this chapter, we have discuss some of the basic functionalities and basic
concepts which plays an vital role in the proposed work. In order to understand the func-
tioning of the proposed algorithm, the reader must go through these prelimnaries to have
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a better understanding of the work. proposed.
Chapter 3:In this chapter, we have studied some papers related to the blind multisigna-
ture scheme.
Chapter 4:In this chapter, we have presented our proposed work about the new untra-
cable blid multisignature scheme.
Chapter 5:In this chapter, we analyzed the security measures of our proposed scheme.
Chapter 6:In this chapter, we presented the results of the program which is imple-
mented in java.
Chapter 7:In this chapter,We put some light on the future work and also concluded our
work.
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Chapter 2
Prelimnaries
In this chapter, we retrospect the literature related to digital signature, mathematics of
cryptography and hash funtions. First, we give a brief overview of cryptography concepts
and digital signatures. In the middle of this chapter we discuss about the prime numbers
and primality test, we also write about how the random numbers are generated, how prime
numbers are generated and why hash functions are important in cryptography. At the last
we discuss preliminaries related to discrete logarithms and Integer factoriation.
2.1 Cryptography Concepts and Digital Signature
Cryptography can be characterized as ensuring data by changing into an indiscernible
arrangement, known as cipher text[8].The cipher text can only be decrypted by those who
has the secret key. Encoded messages can rarely be broken by cryptanalysis, moreover
called code breaking, albeit present day cryptography strategies are for all intents and
purposes unbreakable. Cryptography can be divided in to two categories, one which uses
single key are known as symmetric key systems and the other which uses two keys are
public key system. In symmetic key systme the sender and reciever share the same secret
key, whereas in public key cryptography the two keys are used one is public to all and
another is private key which is only used by recepient of the messages[29]. In case of
signature the signer sign the message with its own private key and the message will be
decrypted by using signers public key ensuring its authencity.
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2.1.1 Digital Signature
The digitization of paperwork has been a major leap in the field of creation and transfer
of documents[29]. Digital signature solves the major security concern for the document.
It is being a digital analog of handwritten signatures and is crucial for identifying the the
sender’s identity and also whether the receiver has received it tamper free[8]. The services
provided by digital signature are:
1. Message integrity
2. Non-repudiation
3. Authentication
But the big cons of digital signature come when the user needs to identify himself
during transactions like purchase (other than cash) or obtaining a service. This breaches
the privacy of the person in concern. Organizations now have massive amounts of data,
threatening these users’ security. Taking it forward, where a digital signature reveals the
identity of the person in any transaction whereas a Blind signature protects the sender’s
privacy and enables the user to get a signature without giving the actual message to the
signer.
2.2 Mathematics of Cryptography
2.2.1 Prime Numbers and Primality Testing
A primality test is an algorithm to find out that whether a given number is prime or not.
A primality test only givees output whether a given number is prie or not in yes or no[8].
In factorization we have to find the factors of a number and in primality test we just have
to check and to find factors we need more computation so it is computationally more
troublesome than primality test.There are two types of primality test.
Deterministic Algorithm:In deterministic primality testing algorithm takes a input
and deterministically produce a output whether a given number is prime or not.
Probabilistic Algorithm: In Probabilistic algorithm it takes an integer number as
input adn produce an out with some error that whether a number is prime or not. It cannot
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tell deterministically the difference between composite number and prime number, but it
is faster than deterministic algorithm[25].
2.2.2 Miller Rabin Primality Test
In the field of cryptography prime numbers are mostly required. Many methods are there
to generate the prime numbers like Fermat’s or Mersenne’s or Safe prime method. But if
at any instance, these methods have failed to create a prime number then problems will
arise[29]. To overcome these problems, Cryptography provides many primality testing
methods. One of the methods that we have used in our implementation part is Miller
Rabin’s primality test. Miller Rabin method is a probabilistic algorithm. Miller Rabin
primality test is the combination two other probabilistic methods which are Fermat test
and Square root test. In this method we write n − 1 as the product of an odd number
m and a power of two. n − 1 = mk. As we know, the Fermat test in base a can be
written as an−1 = amk = a[m] In the above step instead of calculating an−1 mod n in
one step, we are doing it in k + 1 steps. The benefit is square root test is performed in
each step. If at any step the square root test fails to satisfy then we declare the number as
composite[8].
2.2.3 Generation of Prime Numbers
For generating prime numbers we have used Mersenne Prime method. It has the formula
Mp = 2
p − 1. As per the formula if p is a prime number then Mp was thought to be
prime.
2.2.4 Hash Function
We need the one way hash function to generate the message digest of the message. The
message and the message digest is equivalent to a document and the corresponding finger
print. We calculate the message digest in order to achieve message integrity[8]. To create
the message digest the message is passed through a cryptographic hash function. There
are many hash functions designed by Ron Rivest. These hash functions are used to create
the message digest. These are referred to as MD2, MD4, MD5. MD stands for message
digest. We have used the MD5 hash function to create the message digest[29]. MD5
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takes the message as the input and divides the message into blocks of 512 bits and creates
a digest of 128 bits.
2.2.5 Integer factorization Problem
Integer factoring means the composite number is decomposed into the multiples of smaller
integers. In prime factorization we bound those integrs to be prime numbers.There is now
efficient algorithm for very large numbers for integer fatorization.Numerous zones of sci-
ence, mathematics and computer engineering have been presented as a powerful influence
for the issue, including elliptic curves, logarithmic number hypothesis and quantum com-
puting.
2.2.6 Discrete Logarithmic Problem
Discrete logarithms were used mainly in computations of finite fields and elliptic[2]. Dis-
crete logarithm problem has significant importance in the field of cryptography as the
complexity lies in solving the discrete logarithm problem[1].In case factorization prob-
lem,the security of the whole system lies on a single number n.If the attacker can factorize
the number n the it will break the security of the system[27]. Whereas, a discrete loga-
rithm problem says it is very easy to compute a = gx given x and g, where g is the
public parameter and x is the private parameter, but it is very difficult to compute x, given
a and g, which are public parameters. Here g is the primitive element and it is the element
of a cyclic finite gorup. Let G(q) is a group and G(q)∗ is the multiplicative subgroup
in which all the elements are having their multiplicative inverse. Here q is a prime num-
ber. An element g is called as primitive element such that g ∈ G(q) and it generates
the cyclic multiplicative subgroup G(q)∗ of the group G(q). Any element ∈G(q)∗ =
G(q)−0, the discrete logarithm of a with respect to g is that integer x, 0 ≤ x ≤ q−1,
for which a = gx. Here x = logag The DLP is very easy to implement and it is used mostly
in Ecash system.
The discrete logarithm issue has gotten much consideration lately; portrayals of prob-
ably the most productive calculations for discrete logarithms over limited fields can be
found in numerous calculation. The best discrete logarithm calculations have anticipated
that running times comparative would those of the best considering calculations. Rivest
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has investigated the normal time to take care of the discrete logarithm issue both regarding
figuring power and expense.
As a rule, the discrete logarithm in a self-assertive gathering of size n can be figured
in running time O(
√
n), however in numerous gatherings it should be possible speedier.
In similar to the factoring problem, the DLP is accepted to be troublesome further-
more to be the hard heading of a restricted capacity. Hence, it has been the premise of a
few open key cryptosystems, including the ElGamal framework and DSS. The DLP bears
the same connection to these frameworks as considering does to the RSA framework: the
security of these frameworks lays on the suspicion that discrete logarithms are hard to fig-
ure. Despite the fact that the DLP exists in any gathering, when utilized for cryptographic
purposes the gathering is normally Z∗n[16].
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Chapter 3
Literature Review
Blind multisignature is the combination of blind signature and multisignature so it has the
properties of both. It provides anonymity of the blind signature and fairness property of
the multisignature.
Patrick Horster, Markus Michels and Holger Peterson[22] present the first blind multisig-
nature scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem. The advantage of the scheme
is that it gets rid of the assumption that all communication must be written on an public
board (to be more precise, the encrypted vote and, later, the vote itself and the additional
parameter must be written on the board) and gets rid off the additional communicating
phase to open the commitment.In this scheme we have to assume that atleast one of the
administor is honest.
There are two arguments that this assumption is reasonable: First,by use in practise, the
anonymous channel would be simulated by a mix-net where it is assumed that at least one
mix-center is honest as well. Therefore, a trustworthy entity must be assumed anyway.
Second, in the initialization of the scheme, system parameters without trapdoors must be
chosen by the administrators or other authorities. For example, Chenand Burmester as-
sumed the existenceof a trusted center to generate a composite module which is needed
to use the Fiat-Shamir scheme in their system.Clearly, if this center is untrustworthy, the
security is completely lost. While it is difficult in this case to distribute this center into
several centers where only one is honest, it seems to be possible if the security of the
used schemes are based on the discrete logarithm problem[11]. One honest center can
avoid that, say, a trapdoor-prime or a trapdoor-generator is chosen, and can guarantee that
public keys of the administrators are authentic. Obviously, the centers’ Tasks can be done
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by the administrators, if atleast one is honest. Then, the existence of a trusted center is
not necessary. As a result, it seems reasonable to assume that at least one administrator is
honest.
A more serious problem of the schemes mentioned so far, is the possibility of verifiable
buying of votes. The coercer,who taps the line between the administrators and the voter,
might force the voter to use random numbers prepared by him in the voting slip issuing
phase. Then he sees in the voting phase if these numbers will appear again or not and
therefore check if the voter votes the ”correct” candidate. This might be prevented phys-
ically if the voter can’t determine the random numbers by himself. If he is supplied by
random numbers by a (trusted) physical device, which also does the computation for him,
then this attack will fail. Clearly, a more powerful coercer, who can physically see what
the voter votes, can still be successful. This coercer model, however, seems to be less of
practical than of theoretical interest as the effect of vote-buying is only non negligible in
large scale elections, if the number of bought votes is high. As the powerful coercer can’t
see the vote of several voter simultaneously, he needs a large number of supporters for
supervising the voters. This scenario seems not to be very realistic.
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Untraceable Blind Multisignature
4.1 Proposed scheme
The proposed scheme consists of three participants, namely, a group of signers, a trusted
third party, and a requester. It consists of five phases: key generation, blinding, signing,
unblinding, and verification.
Suppose, U be the group of signers such that U = {U1, U2, .. Un}. Each member
Ui is responsible for signing message M. Let there be a group of signers be U1, U2, ..
Un and the message M. A trusted third party(TTP) decides a large prime number p, and
a prime divisor q such that q|(p− 1) and a one way hash function h.
The operation of each phase is described below.
Key generation :
Each signer Ui has to choose its own secret key xi such that 1 < xi < q. g is
the generator of cyclic group of order q ∈ Z∗q . Each signer Ui disclose their public
key yi = g
xi (mod q). After every signer disclose their public key, TTP calculates
combined(group) public key as follows,
Y =
n∏
i=1
yi( mod q). (4.1)
Blinding phase :
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Operation of blinding phase is as follows.
Step 1: Every signer Ui selects a random number ki ∈ Z∗q and compute Ri as
follows.
Ri = g
ki mod q. (4.2)
Then sendsRi to the requester.
Step 2: After recievingRi from all the signers, the requester chooses random num-
ber α, β ∈ Z∗q and computes,
V =
n∏
i=1
Ri mod q. (4.3)
R = V αgβ mod q. (4.4)
Step 3: The requester blinds the message as follows,
M ′ = αMV R−1 mod q. (4.5)
and sends the blinded message(M ′) to the signer.
Signing phase :
In this phase a blinded message is to be signed by the signers.
Step 1: After receiving the blinded message each signer computes Si as follows,
Si = (ki.M
′ + V.xi) mod q. (4.6)
Then the signer sends Si to the TTP.
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Step 2: After recieving all Si from all the signers, the TP calculates the multisigna-
ture as follows,
J =
n∑
i=1
Si mod q. (4.7)
and sends to the requester.
Unblinding phase :
The requester unblinds the signature as follows,
S = (JRV −1 + βM) mod q. (4.8)
Finally the requester get the message signature pair (M, S, r) where
r = R mod q. (4.9)
Verification :
The verifier can verify the sign by the equation stated below. If the below equation
satisfies then the signature is valid and legitimate.
T = (gSy−V )M
−1
mod q. (4.10)
r = T mod q. (4.11)
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Figure 4.1: Block Diagram of the key generation phase
19
Chapter 5
Security Analysis of Proposed
Algorithm
This section shows that this scheme preserves all the characteristic of a blind signature.
5.1 Blindness
Blindness or unlinkability is the property , which prohibits the signer to link the blinded
message to the original message. The signer signs the message without knowing what
is the content of the message[7]. In this scheme, the requester calculates the blinded
message as M ′ = αMV R−1 mod p. If any signer has the intention to see the content
of the message before signing it he was unable to do so because α and β are chosen
randomly by the requester so it makes hard for the signer to reveal the contents of the
message and we are using another factor as a multiple in the blindness equation i.e. V
which is the summation of all the Ri values generated by each signer so it is almost
insuperable for an individual signer to know the content of the message. Hence, the
signer will not be able to see the message M.
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5.2 Untraceability
Untraceability is the property of the blind signature acheme which let a signer unable to
link the message and signature enven though the signature is public.[19] If someone gets
the valid signature, it is hard to link the signature to the message. In this scheme, if the
signer keep arecord set (ki, R
′
i,M , S
′
i,V ,xi), where i= 1, 2 .. n, then also it is hard to
trace the blind signature. When the requester discloses n records (Mi, Ri, Si) to the
public the signer will compute the values M , R, V . However, the signer will not be
able to trace the blind signature by detecting whether each Ri and Ri+1 have the same
relation. Hence, it is hard to trace the signature in this scheme.
5.3 Unforgeability
Forging (M , S, r) is hard because the discrete logarithm problem is hard to solve. As-
sume two cases as follows.
Case 1 : If an adversary try to faux r1,M1, he will be unable to get S1. Since
r = T mod q. (5.1)
r1 = (g
Sy−r)M
−1
. (5.2)
and S1 is unknown. This is a discrete logarithm problem and hard to solve.
Case 2 : If an adversary to fauxM1, S1, he will be unable to get r1. Since
r = T mod q (5.3)
r1 = (g
Sy−r)M
−1
(5.4)
and r1 is unknown. This is also a discrete logarithm problem and hard to solve.
21
5.4 Correctness Security Analysis of Proposed Algorithm
5.4 Correctness
The correctness of the verification equation is shown below,
T = (gSy−V )M
−1
.
r = T mod q.
r = (gSy−r)M
−1
= g(JRV −1 + βM − (
n∑
i=1
xi)r)
M−1
= V αgβ
= R mod q.
= r
(5.5)
The proposed Blind signature scheme is based upon the security of solving hard com-
putation assumption such as DLP and IFP. It is not possible to attack at this scheme to
obtain private keys. The proposed scheme use complex function in order to obtain high
security. Analysis of security features is done and found that it is resistant against forgery
attack such as existential and selective forgery. Proposed blind multisignature scheme
claims to be more secure than existing scheme. It is reliable for confidential transaction,
e-commerce, e-cash, e-voting, communication etc.
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Implementation and result
6.1 Implementation
The Proposed Scheme is implemented in java platform. We use netbeans IDE 7.3 as inte-
grated development environment. We don’t need any database because we are not storing
the keys in our algorithm. In our program we use java big integers for computing very
large numbers. We use cryptography package and security package to generate random
numbers and generators. We use the hash function in java to get the message digest, by
using SHA-2 algorithm. The message size we chose is of 5KB.
The standard hardware configuration is :
1. Hard disk should be 90 GB
2. RAM 2GB.
3. OS can be of user’s choice.
The implementation consists of following steps in the proposed scheme:
1. Key Setup
2. Blinding of the Message
3. Signature
4. Unblinding
5. Verification
23
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6.2 Results
The proposed scheme is implemented with AMD quad core processor along with 4 GB
RAM in using java. After execution we got the following time for each phase in our al-
gorithm using ””System Time”.The hardware is same for all the phases.
First of all generate a generator by taking input a large prime number. We also want pri-
vate key of the signers. here in this code we use 5 signers.
value of generator g 54216440574364751416096484883257051280474283943804743768346673007661
08262613900542681289080713724597310673074119355136085795982097390670890367185141189
796.
value of p 1323237689519861240754793071826743575772852702962340887224515603975771302903636
8719146452186041204237350521785240337048752071462798273003935646236777459223.
value of q 857393771208094202104259627990318636601332086981.
Enter private key Number : 46464
Enter private key Number : 313215
Enter private key Number : 648454
Enter private key Number : 34165
Enter private key Number : 654846
Public key for signer 1 828219181897331915706343176718742175216868673231
Public key for signer 2 762163890635232521565637106043926028507037525621
Public key for signer 3 781439396482122571608505562948684655492903274801
Public key for signer 4 807613618464235894124234821305274496437499862119
Public key for signer 5 790421985953475447588739851809956423193647769347
Hashing process for message
Taking input from file and converting it into the message digest
Hex format : 173d87aeb834951ef097585eb2550fed8653caf4d047759855c77f88aadb402c
Converting hexcode to biginteger for use in program 656994352159577377578393021552384875855680
944817886350027289388127646072876
Verification process
The signature is verified using the verification algorithm and the result of verification is
published as true/false. In this case the result is true.
The computational time for each phase are:
Time elaspsed in Blinding time 4.03ms
Time elaspsed in Signing time .015ms
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Time elaspsed in Unblinding time 1.05ms
Time elaspsed in Verification time .0129ms
The message length taken is of 5KB and the signature generated is of 20 Byte.
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Figure 6.1: Output of Blind multisignature part 1
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Figure 6.2: Output of Blind multisignature part 2
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
The proposed BS scheme is based upon the hard computation assumption i.e. DLP. The
proposed scheme is implemented in Java. It is also analysed and verified successfully.
We had done the security analysis of our proposed scheme and found it resistant to
DLP attacks.The proposed scheme can have wide range of application in areas such as
e-cash, evoting, e-commerce. It ensures to be more secure than existing scheme. The
proposed scheme ensure, verifiability, non-repudiation, identityability. We are trying to
make a more secure blind multi signature using ECDLP in future by improving the current
scheme.
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